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ARTICLES 
NURSING FACILITY ENFORCEMENT BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICE 
APPEALS BOARD - THE BREAKDOWN OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT STANDARDS, AND 
MODEST PROPOSALS TO ACCOMMODATE AGENCY 
PREROGATIVES WITH FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
Joseph L. Bianculli † 
ABSTRACT 
Skilled nursing facilities (commonly called nursing homes) are said to be 
the second-most regulated businesses in America, second only to nuclear 
power plants. Such facilities are subject to comprehensive federal regulation 
at 42 C.F.R. Part 483 (the “Long Term Care Requirements of Participation”) 
that govern virtually every aspect of facility design, staffing, programming, 
service delivery, resident rights, and even resident outcomes. That degree of 
regulation reflects public demand that the government has a responsibility to 
protect frail, elderly residents, and also the demands of federal and state 
governments as customers, since they pay for the care of more than three-
quarters of nursing facility residents through the Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has regulatory authority 
to enforce the Long Term Care Requirements of Participation, including the 
authority to impose a variety of “remedial” sanctions tailored to the “severity” 
and “scope” of noncompliance. The Social Security Act, and CMS’ 
regulations, in turn, provide for an administrative appeal process before the 
DHHS “Departmental Appeals Board” (the Board) by which nursing 
facilities can challenge sanctions with which they disagree. In that process, an 
administrative law judge conducts a trial-type adjudication, and then a panel 
of the Board itself reviews the ALJ’s Decision. 
In a perfect world, CMS would win every nursing facility enforcement 
appeal because inspectors would cite violations of clear standards; 
supervisors would weed out weak cases; the agency would offer sufficient 
evidence and argument to meet any applicable standard of review; and ALJs 
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would issue well-reasoned and supported decisions. But over the years, as the 
number and complexity of the regulations and accompanying agency 
directives—and appeals—has ballooned, the enforcement and appeal process 
has become sloppier. Some agency guidance is ambiguous or allows 
inspectors great room for “judgment.” Overworked inspectors make factual 
mistakes or can be unfamiliar with current standards of clinical practice. 
Regulators can have unrealistic expectations. Imposition of sanctions can be 
unpredictable, subjective and even arbitrary in specific cases. And ALJs can 
be result-oriented.  
This paper addresses a more glaring legal flaw in the administrative appeal 
process. Every court that has addressed the question has held that the Board’s 
administrative review process is governed by the substantive and procedural 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). But in recent 
years, the Board has held in a series of cases that it is not subject to even the 
most basic of those standards. For instance, the Board says that it can review 
sanctions de novo, and may substitute otherwise-prohibited “post hoc 
rationalizations” to “fix” flawed agency actions. It says that it may “presume” 
that CMS’ allegations of noncompliance are true, that the agency has no 
burden to support them, and that a petitioner challenging agency action has 
the burden to “persuade” it otherwise—all directly contrary to APA 
standards. Not coincidentally, during the past decade, the Board has reversed 
every ALJ Decision in favor of a nursing facility that CMS has asked it to 
review.  
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interfere with an agency’s 
legitimate enforcement prerogatives, particularly where, as here, a specific 
enforcement action involves application of specialized regulations in an area 
within the agency’s expertise. But nursing facilities dissatisfied with the 
Board’s cutting of procedural corners are appealing more and more cases 
raising APA issues to the courts, and the courts now are addressing such 
issues. The premise of this paper is that it is in the best interests of all—CMS, 
the Board, regulated entities, and the residents whose interests ultimately are 
at issue—that the Board reform its processes, and conform with the APA, 
before the courts do so on an ad hoc basis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Skilled nursing facilities (commonly called nursing homes) are said to be 
the second-most regulated businesses in America, second only to nuclear 
power plants.1 Such facilities are subject to comprehensive overlapping 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. The media, and much of the public, sometimes do not distinguish among “nursing 
facilities,” which are highly regulated facilities that provide “hands on” nursing and 
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federal, state, and local regulation of virtually every aspect of facility design, 
staffing, programming, service delivery, resident rights, and even resident 
outcomes.2 That degree of regulation reflects not only the universal public 
demand that the government has a responsibility to protect frail, elderly 
residents from abuse and exploitation,3 but also the demands of federal and 
state governments as customers, since they pay for the care of more than 
three-quarters of nursing facility residents through the Medicare and 
Medicaid Programs.4  
                                                                                                                                      
rehabilitation therapy services, as opposed to assisted living facilities, rest homes, retirement 
communities, personal care homes, and other congregate facilities that also serve elderly or 
disabled persons. The latter generally provide less intensive medical services (if any), are much 
less regulated by the states, and are not regulated at all by the federal government. According 
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), there are about 15,600 
nursing facilities nationwide serving about 1.35 million residents at any given time and about 
twice as many assisted living and similar facilities serving an unknown number of residents. 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., VITAL HEALTH AND 
STAT. SER. 3, NO. 38, LONG-TERM CARE PROVIDERS AND SERVICE USERS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
DATA FROM THE NATIONAL STUDY OF LONG-TERM CARE PROVIDERS, 2013-2014 (2016) 
[hereinafter NCHS REPORT]. The discussion in this paper is limited to federal regulation of 
nursing facilities.  
 2. Persons who live in nursing facilities are called “residents” for regulatory purposes. 
The NCHS Report indicates that two-thirds of nursing facility residents are women, about half 
are over age 85, and about 15% are under age 65. See NCHS REPORT, supra note 2.  
 3. “Nursing home abuse and neglect” is a perennial topic of media reports, political 
attention, and plaintiffs’ lawyer advertising. For instance, one plaintiffs’ law firm’s website 
warns that 10 million nursing facility residents are abused each year (eight times the total 
number of residents). See NURSING HOME ABUSE CTR., 
http://www.nursinghomeabusecenter.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). The actual number of 
even alleged abuse and neglect cases—by any definition, with even one, of course, being too 
many—is far lower, and less than 10% of such allegations ever are substantiated. One problem 
is definitional; for instance, various state laws, professional associations and authors define 
“sexual abuse” to include everything from inappropriate jokes or greeting cards, to vulgar 
remarks and threats, to unwanted nudity or forced photography, to physical contact including 
kissing and fondling, to actual criminal rape. In fact, the most common allegation of sexual 
abuse in nursing facilities involves resident-to-resident kissing and fondling. See generally 
Robert A. Hawks, Grandparent Molesting: Sexual Abuse of Elderly Nursing Home Residents 
and Its Prevention, 8 MARQ. ELDER ADVISOR 159, 172 (2006); NCCD, The Study of Sexual Abuse 
of Vulnerable Adults in Care Facilities, VIMEO (Apr. 20, 2011), https://vimeo.com/36486508 
(Nat’l Council on Crime & Delinquency webinar by Dr. Holly Ramsey-Klawsnik & Dr. Pamela 
Teaster from the Nat’l Comm. for Prevention of Elder Abuse).  
 4. Medicare, the federal health insurance program for persons age 65 and over and some 
disabled persons, covers limited post-hospitalization long term care services, usually for 
rehabilitation following a hospitalization. Medicaid, the cooperative state-federal medical 
assistance program for persons who meet certain income and asset limits, pays for nursing 
facility care for qualifying beneficiaries who meet threshold medical criteria. According to 
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No one disputes that regulation of health and safety for elderly persons in 
nursing facilities is a vital governmental function. Nursing care is provided 
by people who make mistakes, have bad days, and can be overwhelmed by 
emergencies; and even one bad apple abusing or neglecting a vulnerable 
resident is one too many. But over the years, as the number and complexity 
of federal and state regulations and accompanying directives has ballooned, 
some regulations have become obsolete and do not directly address the 
circumstances of modern nursing facilities or current standards of resident 
care. Some regulations are ambiguous or allow inspectors, known as 
surveyors, great room for administrative “judgment.” Surveyors can make 
mistakes or be unfamiliar with current standards of practice. Moreover, 
regulators can have unrealistic expectations (or political axes to grind). And 
imposition of sanctions for violations can be unpredictable, subjective, and 
even arbitrary in specific cases.  
Whether the current regulatory system—or any regulatory system—can 
address and resolve all human performance issues, even in a critical area such 
as health care, is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this paper focuses 
on one aspect of this regulatory regimen, the appeals process by which 
nursing facilities can contest what they believe to be unwarranted or excessive 
“enforcement” sanctions imposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) for violations of the federal “Long Term Care Requirements 
of Participation.”5 In some ways, this one small area of administrative 
litigation vividly illustrates how an increasingly authoritarian, yet resource-
strapped bureaucracy, cuts legal corners and minimizes oversight of its 
                                                                                                                                      
DHHS, 96.9% of nursing facilities participate in the Medicare Program, and 95.1% participate 
in the Medicaid Program (the balance serves only private pay or charity residents). See NCHS 
REPORT, supra note 2. Nationwide, Medicaid pays for the care of about two-thirds of nursing 
facility residents, and Medicare another 10% or so (the balance pays privately, with insurance, 
or charity care), although those percentages vary from state to state and facility to facility, 
depending on the specific services the facility provides.  
 5. Various “chapters” or “parts” of the Medicare regulations set forth “conditions of 
participation” that various categories of health care providers—hospitals, home health 
agencies, hospices, and the like—must meet to “participate in” the Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs. For nursing facilities, these requirements are called the Long Term Care 
Requirements of Participation and are found at 42 C.F.R. pt.t 483. See 42 C.F.R. § 483 (2016). 
As discussed in the text, CMS amplifies and explains these regulatory requirements in 
thousands of pages of “Interpretive Guidelines,” notices, directives, memoranda, and the like. 
While the latter are not legally binding on nursing facilities because they are not promulgated 
pursuant to the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, CMS 
does consider such informal directives to be authoritative interpretations of the regulations 
and does direct inspectors to evaluate compliance by them. See e.g., CTR. MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., State Operations Manual, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/som107ap_pp_guidelines_ltcf.pdf. 
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actions. The premise of this paper is that this insulation of agency action from 
effective oversight is caused less by any particular administration’s politics or 
policies than by the difficulty—some would say impossibility—of effective 
outside review of agency decision-making at the complex intersection of law 
and science. For instance, the agency can paint its specific enforcement 
activities in very broad strokes, such as protection of resident health and 
safety. 
As discussed below, a series of recent judicial decisions illustrates the 
practical and legal difficulties that courts face when designing remedies 
where CMS, overwhelmed by inadequate resources, uses legal and 
evidentiary shortcuts to dispose of (or simply not to decide) administrative 
appeals. Not incidentally, CMS thereby prevents, limits, or delays judicial 
review of its actions (which itself has due process implications). This Article 
suggests that the agency has the tools to address and fix its problems—before 
the courts step in, as they increasingly are doing—and, specifically, that the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)6 provides the necessary structure for 
appropriate administrative decision-making.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A detailed review of the history and content of nursing facility regulation 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but some history is useful to put the 
shortcomings of today’s regulatory and appeals processes into perspective.7 
Prior to the 1970s, most “old age homes” and the like were operated by 
religious or voluntary organizations or local governments, for instance, “poor 
houses.” Congress enacted the Medicare Program in 1965 to provide basic 
health insurance to elderly persons. At that time, elderly persons were the 
poorest age cohort in America, largely because any health issue could be 
economically devastating.8 But Medicare provided, and provides, only 
limited coverage for post-acute care, generally limited to 100 days per year 
for post-hospital care in a nursing facility, usually for rehabilitation from 
surgery or an acute event such as a stroke. In 1966, Congress enacted the 
Medicaid Program as an adjunct to Medicare to pay for certain services that 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (1946). 
 7. As discussed in the text, Congress largely based the current regulatory process on a 
landmark 1986 report by the Institute of Medicine. See INST. MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY 
OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES app. 1 (1986) [hereinafter IOM REPORT] (summarizing the history 
of long-term care). 
 8. See CMS’ Program History, CTR. FOR MED. HISTORY, cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-
information/History (summarizing the history of Medicare) (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
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Medicare did not cover for poor people.9 It was not long before entrepreneurs 
realized that many elderly persons who required long term nursing care 
qualified for Medicaid, and so through the 1970s and 1980s the number of 
nursing facilities—about two-thirds of which now are operated as for-profit 
businesses—grew rapidly, to the point that Medicaid reimbursement for 
nursing facility services is now one of the largest line items on most states’ 
budgets.10  
At the same time, real and perceived abuses of the Program grew: 
incompetent operators; untrained or insufficient staff; financial exploitation 
and other “resident rights” issues; and a variety of clinical concerns, including 
lack of a uniform resident assessment instrument, inconsistent care planning, 
and inadequate registered nurse coverage and physician oversight. Resident 
advocacy groups such as the National Citizens Committee for Nursing Home 
Reform began to publicize such concerns and tied them in large part to the 
lack of effective federal regulatory requirements.11 These concerns focused on 
substantive requirements as well as the lack of effective enforcement 
mechanisms. For instance, early Medicare regulations required only that a 
facility have certain policies and procedures in place but did not address how 
well the facility actually implemented such policies.12 Elder rights advocates 
                                                                                                                                      
 9. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Program History, MEDICAID.GOV, 
https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/program-history (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
 10. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MEDPAC) reports that Medicaid 
accounted for 28.7% of all state spending in FY 2016. In comparison, MEDPAC reports that 
state spending on elementary and secondary education totaled 19.6% of state budgets (local 
government school spending is much more in most states), and state spending for higher 
education totaled 10.5% of state spending. See medpac.gov/subtopic/medicaid-share-of-
states-budgets. In recent years, between 30% and 40% of Medicaid spending has been devoted 
to long term care (the amount of long-term care spending continues to increase, but the 
percentage of total Medicaid spending devoted to long term care is declining, as most 
“Medicaid expansion” under the Affordable Care Act is for non-long-term care services). See 
Eiken et al., Long-Term Services and Supports: 2015 Total Medicaid Spending, MEDICAID.GOV, 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
 11. See History, THE NAT’L CONSUMER VOICE FOR QUALITY LONG-TERM CARE, 
https://www.theconsumervoice.org/about/history (summarizing consumer efforts to 
persuade Congress to address nursing home reform in the 1970s) (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
 12. At the same time, the legislative history to the current nursing facility enforcement 
statute, which is described in the text below, recites that Congress did not intend the inspection 
and enforcement process “to determine whether every nursing facility is in compliance with 
every requirement of participation. Instead, its purpose is to detect facilities where residents 
are not receiving quality care.” H.R. Rep. No. 391, at 468 (1987), reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1. As this paper illustrates, during the last 30 years, as widespread 
structural quality-related issues (inconsistent staffing requirements, lack of uniform resident 
assessment and care planning, lax physician oversight, overuse or misuse of psychotropic 
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focused on so-called “yo-yo” compliance, where surveyors repeatedly cited 
noncompliance at a facility—which suggested inability or unwillingness to 
comply—but the facility suffered no adverse consequences. At that time, the 
law basically limited sanctions for noncompliance to decertification or 
“termination” of an offending facility from the Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs—which CMS was reluctant to do because of the disruption and 
“transfer trauma” associated with involuntary resident relocation, and loss of 
jobs.13 Indeed, the few courts that addressed potential decertifications at this 
time generally were reluctant to relocate residents involuntarily unless 
conditions throughout a facility were dire.14  
                                                                                                                                      
medications, and the like) have largely been eliminated from nursing facilities, the focus of the 
survey and enforcement process has drifted away from such systemic issues toward citation of 
allegedly inadequate individual resident outcomes (sometimes without sophisticated analysis 
of causation or inevitability) and specific instances of staff errors and omissions, poor 
judgments, or even second-guessing of professional judgments in specific cases. 
 13. See, e.g., IOM Report, supra note 8, at ch. 5. 
 14. See Lexington Mgmt. Co. v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 656 F. Supp. 36, 41 (W.D. Mo. 
1986), where the court enjoined termination of Medicaid payments to a nursing facility 
pending the appeal of a Medicaid termination, on the ground that termination of payment 
would have required relocation of the residents. In characterizing the prevention of transfer 
trauma as a matter of public interest, the court explained: 
 
[N]ursing home residents are susceptible to a phenomenon known as "transfer 
trauma." This phenomenon -- which is oftentimes characterized by a refusal to 
eat, a general sense of disorientation, or a loss of one's will to live -- commonly 
affects nursing home residents who are suddenly forced to vacate familiar 
surroundings. Transfer trauma has even been directly linked to the deaths of 
some nursing home residents. 
Likewise, in Wayside Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 663 F. Supp. 945, 954 
(N.D. Ohio 1987), the court noted that “transfer of some of the patients may be difficult for 
many and impossible for some.” The court granted an injunction because “[p]reserving the 
status quo under these circumstances until the decision has been thoroughly considered avoids 
the transfer of patients. . . .” Id. See also Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 
1976) (temporarily enjoining termination of Medicaid payments to nursing facility where 
involuntary relocation of residents “would create a major disruption in their lives.”); 
Greenwald v. Whalen, No. 78-Civ.2765-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1979), reprinted in COMMERCE 
CLEARING HOUSE, CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE ¶ 29,512 (1977) (enjoining reduction 
of Medicaid payments to nursing facility because “the involuntary transfer of aged, seriously 
ill patients is dangerous to them”); Burchette v. Dumpson, 387 F. Supp. 812, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 
1974) (explaining that risk of transfer trauma constitutes irreparable injury because “[c]hanges 
in surroundings and movement of long distances of senior citizens who are suffering from 
physical and psychological infirmities are likely to aggravate their condition and increase the 
likelihood of death”); MacLeod v. Miller, CCH Medicare and Medicaid Guide ¶ 30,560 (Colo. 
Ct. App. May 22, 1980) (overruling trial court refusal to enjoin transfer of nursing home 
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In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration proposed “outcome oriented” 
regulations designed to address the actual impact of facility noncompliance 
on resident health and safety.15 However, the regulations were not finalized 
before the Carter Administration left office, and the Reagan Administration 
withdrew the proposal as part of its “deregulation” efforts.16    
In response, Congress commissioned a study of nursing facility quality by 
the Institute of Medicine of the National Institutes of Health. The Institute of 
Medicine published an exhaustive report in 1986 (the IOM Report) that 
identified dozens of structural and operational issues regarding staffing, 
quality of care, quality of life, resident rights, and regulatory compliance.17 
The IOM Report also made numerous policy recommendations, which 
Congress translated almost verbatim into legislative language included in the 
“nursing home reform” provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987 (OBRA ’87).18  
These OBRA ‘87 provisions, which are scattered throughout the Medicare 
and Medicaid Titles of the Social Security Act, remain the substantive basis 
for nursing facility regulation today (even though residents, facilities and 
clinical standards of care have changed considerably in the interim). The 
statutory provisions include very detailed operational and clinical provisions, 
as well as detailed provisions for residents’ rights, that provide the basis for 
what became known as the regulatory “Long Term Care Requirements of 
Participation,” which were promulgated in 1995 and have been revised from 
time to time in the interim, most recently in 2015.19  
                                                                                                                                      
resident because the “psychological and physical side effects” of transfer trauma “would be 
immediate and irreparable”).  
 15. New Directions for Skilled Nursing and Intermediate Care Facilities, 43 Fed. Reg. 
24873 (proposed June 8, 1978) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405 and 449). 
 16. See Weiner, et al., “Nursing Home Care Quality,” Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, 
December 2007, at 4. 
 17. COMM’N ON NURSING HOME REG., NAT’L INST. OF MED., IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF 
CARE IN NURSING HOMES (1986).  
 18. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (Dec. 22, 1987). For several years during the 1980s, 
Congress accumulated all “must pass” legislation into a session-ending omnibus bill so that 
President Reagan could not veto individual measures. The nursing home reform provisions of 
OBRA ‘87 are included in Title IV of the Bill, including substantive requirements at §§ 4201 
et seq.; survey and certification procedures at §§ 4202 et seq.; and enforcement provisions at 
§§ 4213 et seq. Most, but not all, of those provisions are codified in Title 42 of the U.S. Code, 
with most Medicare provisions located at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3 et seq., and most more or less 
parallel Medicaid provisions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r et seq. There are additional provisions 
throughout the statute. 
 19. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care 
Facilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 42168 et seq. (proposed July 16, 2015) (to be published at 42 C.F.R. pts. 
2019] NURSING FACILITY ENFORCEMENT 231 
 
OBRA ‘87 also includes “enforcement” provisions that set forth a rigorous 
inspection (or “survey”) process and authorize the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to impose a range of “remedies” or sanctions for 
noncompliance in addition to termination, including CMPs, directed plans 
of correction, denials of payment for new Medicare/Medicaid admissions, 
and others.20 The notion was that a range of sanctions could be tailored to the 
“severity” and “scope” of noncompliance, replacing the previous provisions 
that provided only for termination from the Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs, in order to promote effective corrective of deficiencies rather than 
only punishment.21  
The Secretary has delegated enforcement activities, including imposition 
of sanctions, to CMS. CMS, in turn, enters into contracts with “State Survey 
Agencies” to perform the actual inspections or “surveys,” subject to CMS 
oversight.22 Additionally, CMS has delegated day-to-day enforcement 
activities to its ten Regional Offices. This enforcement system triggers the 
appeals processes addressed in this Article. 
This background provides the context for the administrative law issues 
addressed in this Article. Where Congress delegates enforcement authority 
to an administrative agency—that is, when Congress creates, and then 
delegates, the authority to impose fines or other penalties—that agency is 
then bound by the due process requirements of the Constitution. The courts 
generally are unwilling to frustrate an agency’s legitimate enforcement 
prerogatives by imposing burdensome procedural requirements, so the 
courts have established minimal constitutional due process requirements for 
agency enforcement activities. These requirements typically include only 
notice of the grounds for the agency’s action; some formal opportunity to 
contest the action before a neutral decisionmaker; some statement of grounds 
for the agency’s final action; and generally—although not always—some 
                                                                                                                                      
405, 431, 447, 482, 483, 485, and 488) (Final rule published at 81 Fed. Reg. 68688 et seq. (Oct. 
4, 2016)).   
 20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g) (2014),1395i-3(h) (2014), 1396r(g) (2011), 1396r(h) (2011).  
 21. However, as noted in note 12 above, it is unclear whether the Congress ever intended 
the enforcement process to focus on specific acts and omissions, or specific resident outcomes, 
as it currently does, as opposed to overall quality of care. Indeed, one of the authors of the 
IOM Report suggested to the author that using policy aspirations such as those set forth in the 
Report as the basis for sanctioning bad outcomes was “pushing a string,” that is, that a focus 
only on punishing bad outcomes is, at best, an inefficient way to describe and incentivize 
desired outcomes. But as the discussion in the text illustrates, it is difficult to translate policy 
aspirations into a regulatory enforcement system, much less into an appeal process. IOM 
REPORT, supra note 8. 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a) (2008).  
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provision for judicial review.23 At the same time, overburdened federal courts 
are reluctant to open their doors to categories of agency enforcement cases 
for which agency adjudicators and administrative law judges (“ALJs”) may 
serve, at least in the first instance, as effective substitutes for Article III 
judges.24 The Supreme Court has indicated that courts generally should 
accord considerable deference to an agency’s interpretation and application 
of its own regulations, especially where specific interpretation and 
application of a regulation is said to be within the scope of the agency’s 
expertise.25 Of course, application of these general rules can be problematic 
where, for instance, the agency is good at designing and describing inspection 
procedures, but has little specific knowledge or expertise about the 
circumstances of a specific patient’s case, or the considerations that affected 
a physician’s or a nurse’s professional decisions in a case that an inspector is 
reviewing. 
The questions where to draw the line between effective implementation of 
delegated statutory enforcement authority and “arbitrary and capricious” 
agency action; and how to facilitate effective oversight of an agencies’ day-to-
day decision making without unduly burdening the agency, are not new.   
Seventy years ago, Congress enacted the APA26 largely to address concerns 
by Congress, regulated entities, and civil libertarians about administrative 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 24. Congress created in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1935), what the courts 
call a “channeling” requirement that generally requires exhaustion of the administrative 
appeal process before a court may review any CMS enforcement action. The history of 
application of this provision is extremely complicated; suffice it to say that for decades courts, 
including the Supreme Court, carved out various exceptions, including for certain nursing 
facility appeals. See, e.g., Mediplex of Mass.v. Shalala, 39 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D. Mass. 1999). In 
2000, the Supreme Court closed all such loopholes and held that any claim arising under the 
Medicare statute must at least be “presented to” the agency’s administrative review process 
before resort to federal court. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000). 
Since that time, federal courts almost uniformly have held that they do not have jurisdiction 
to address the merits of CMS enforcement actions before the administrative process is 
complete. See, e.g., Cathedral Rock of N. Coll. Hill, Inc. v. Shalala, 223 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 2000). 
As discussed in the text, the “channeling” rule, combined with lengthy delays in the 
administrative process, makes it difficult to get relief from termination actions and large civil 
money penalties.  
 25. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In 
general, under Chevron, an agency may “interpret” its regulations only where the plain 
language of the regulation is ambiguous, the interpretation is within the scope of the agency’s 
expertise, and the authority delegated by Congress. Over the years, some courts have expanded 
this notion of “deference” to application of agency regulations—whether ambiguous or not—
in specific cases, a result that is controversial today. 
 26. 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2000).  
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agency accountability as the number, size, and authority of agencies grew 
during the New Deal and World War II. All shared the concern that there 
was no practical way for Congress to provide detailed oversight of the day-
to-day activities of the myriad agencies Congress had created to implement 
various regulatory, economic, and social welfare programs. Thus, as the 
Supreme Court has put it, Congress enacted the APA as “as an antidote to” 
this lack of accountability.27 According to one commentator, “administrative 
law [developed as] the law controlling administrative agencies, not the law 
produced by them.”28 Likewise, Justice Felix Frankfurter noted, in a celebrated 
law review article that foreshadowed and largely prompted enactment of the 
APA, “how to fit ancient liberties [to administrative agencies] . . . is the special 
task of administrative law.”29  
The APA thus addresses two main topics: rulemaking and adjudication. 
First, “rulemaking,” the process for enacting (or repealing) regulations under 
which the agency establishes and imposes requirements or prohibitions.30 
Such procedures include public notice of proposed regulations (or repeals), 
a clear statement of purpose and statutory basis for same, and an opportunity 
for public comment. The courts regularly enforce such procedural hurdles as 
checks on impatient or unrestrained agency or executive branch action31 and, 
as we see in contemporary news reports, the APA can thwart executive 
branch efforts to repeal regulations without employing such procedures.32 
And second, “adjudication,” the process by which an agency enforces its 
rules or orders in specific cases; or, as in the case of nursing facility 
enforcement actions, the process by which the regulated party can challenge 
such actions.33 This Article addresses the second part of this second topic, 
that is, the process by which a nursing facility can challenge a CMS finding 
of noncompliance with the Long Term Care Requirements of Participation, 
                                                                                                                                      
 27. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Corp., 415 U.S. 1, 34 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting 
on other grounds); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).  
 28. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §1.1, 4 (1984) (emphasis added).  
 29. Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 586 (1941).  
 30. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966). 
 31. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
 32. See, e.g., Lorelei Laird, Political Lawsuits Bring the Administrative Procedure Act to the 
Forefront, ABA J. (Mar. 5, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/political_lawsuits_bring_the_administrative_proce
dure_act_to_the_forefront; Reinventing Governance, Trump Faces Major Hurdle for 
Rescinding Rule Under the Administrative Procedure Act, REINVENTING GOVERNANCE (Feb. 01, 
2018), https://fednews.iwpnews.com/trump-faces-major-hurdles-rescinding-rules-under-
administrative-procedure-act. 
 33. 5 U.S.C §§ 554 (1978), 556 (1990), 557 (1976), 558 (1966). 
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and the resulting sanction; how far that process has drifted from the 
requirements of the APA, and what can be done to get the process back on 
track.  
This paper applies general administrative law principles in this narrow 
context. For instance, where does the APA draw the line between facilitation 
of effective agency action and a regulated party’s right to due process? Does 
the APA allow an agency to develop or implement a review system that allows 
a non-ALJ to overrule an ALJ’s findings of fact or conclusions of law that the 
ALJ made following an “on the record” proceeding? If so, has the APA failed? 
And if courts defer to that sort of agency administrative review, has the 
agency become an unaccountable (and extra-constitutional) fourth branch 
of government?  
Again, the context of these issues is critical. In a perfect world, an agency 
enforcing health and safety requirements would prevail on the merits in every 
enforcement case because the regulated party would be on notice of exactly 
what behavior the regulation requires or prohibits; the agency inspector 
would carefully document how the party violated that requirement or 
prohibition; supervisors, or agency counsel, would weed out (or send 
inspectors back to fix) questionable or weak cases; and the evidence and 
rationale supporting a violation would be expressed clearly in a charging 
document, agency pleadings, and the ALJ’s Decision.  
Unfortunately, those ideal steps do not always happen in CMS nursing 
facility cases. Surveyors sometimes make up and employ ad hoc standards 
not set forth in regulations or CMS guidance; emotional reactions to negative 
resident outcomes sometimes overcome reasoned analysis and application of 
regulations; poorly trained or inexperienced surveyors sometimes render 
judgments beyond the scope of their expertise; supervisors sometimes are 
reluctant to counter the decisions of low level officials (sometimes from fear 
of appearing “soft” on violators); ALJs sometimes rubber-stamp agency 
decisions on the basis of “presumptions” of noncompliance; and the agency 
frequently limits the scope of administrative review. 
This Article examines these issues through the lens of the Department of 
Health and Human Services’ (“DHHS”) “Departmental Appeals Board” 
(“DAB” or “Board”), the administrative board that nursing facilities 
dissatisfied with adverse findings and sanctions must appeal to before 
heading to court. The premise of the article is that legislative and internal 
oversight of this sort of nuts-and-bolts agency enforcement decision making 
largely has failed. Thus, if there is to be any accountability in the system at 
all, the agency itself must impose internal discipline, largely structured by the 
APA, lest courts eventually impose such discipline from outside, on an ad 
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hoc basis, sometimes in cases that present extreme fact patterns, and without 
necessarily considering all of the agency’s legitimate prerogatives.  
III. THE ENFORCEMENT AND APPEALS PROCESS 
As noted, there are about 15,600 nursing facilities in the country 
(providing care to about 1.35 million residents), nearly all of which 
“participate” in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs. In order to obtain and 
maintain such “certification,” a facility must comply with the “Long Term 
Care Requirements of Participation” set forth in 42 C.F.R. Part 483. Those 
provisions establish hundreds of specific clinical, resident rights, operational 
and other requirements.34  
CMS evaluates compliance with the Long Term Care Requirements of 
Participation via unannounced annual and “complaint” surveys, usually 
conducted by a “State Survey Agency” (“SSA”), typically a State Health 
Department, that acts under contract as CMS’ agent.35 CMS publishes various 
manuals in which it describes in great detail both the substance of the 
regulations and its survey procedures. These include the “State Operations 
Manual,” a multi-thousand page tome in which CMS describes some five 
hundred “tags,” or breakdowns, of the regulations.36 In the State Operations 
Manual, CMS also provides instructions to surveyors regarding how a facility 
can meet, or fail to meet, the requirement; the sorts of document reviews and 
interviews surveyors must conduct (sometimes down to the script); and how 
to evaluate the seriousness of any noncompliance. 
A facility must remain in “substantial compliance” with the Long Term 
Care Requirements of Participation, which is defined by regulation as “a level 
of compliance with the requirements of participation such that any identified 
deficiencies pose no greater risk to resident health or safety than the potential 
for causing minimal harm.”37 This provision must be read in conjunction 
with various provisions of the State Operations Manual under which 
                                                                                                                                      
 34. States also impose and enforce their own regulatory requirements, typically via 
licensure requirements, most of which are similar, or even identical, to the federal certification 
requirements. Some, but not all, states impose parallel licensure sanctions, and state appeals 
processes vary considerably. Again, this Article addresses only the federal appeals process. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(a) (2008). CMS also conducts some surveys directly, usually to 
“look behind” the SSA’s performance, but the general process is the same. 
 36. The “State Operations Manual” is an online-only manual that CMS updates on an 
ongoing basis. See generally CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PUB. NO. 100-07, STATE 
OPERATIONS MANUAL, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Internet-Only-Manuals-IOMs-Items/CMS1201984. 
 37. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.300 (1994), 488.330 (2011). 
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surveyors assign a score to each cited “deficiency” from a table that describes 
four levels of “severity” (potential for minimal harm, potential for more than 
minimal harm, actual harm, and “immediate jeopardy’ to resident health and 
safety), and three levels of “scope” (isolated, pattern, widespread). CMS’ 
enforcement regulation then assigns sanctions, for instance, the amount of a 
CMP, based upon a finding of noncompliance, and this score.38  
Surveyors are typically Registered Nurses, or professionals from other 
pertinent disciplines, who are qualified to perform surveys by experience, and 
by passing a CMS training course.39 In practice, CMS allows surveyors to 
exercise “judgment” about how to interpret and apply both the regulations 
and CMS’ Interpretive Guidelines to the regulations. For instance, CMS 
manuals describe hundreds of examples of potentially inappropriate uses of 
medications, and CMS allows surveyors to second-guess physician orders for 
such medications.40 If the SSA finds noncompliance—and more than 90% of 
nursing facilities are cited for some degree of noncompliance annually41—it 
documents its “findings”—that is, its allegations of noncompliance—in a 
written “Statement of Deficiencies.” The facility then must submit and 
implement a written “Plan of Correction.”42 The regulations also require each 
State to provide facilities with a process for an “informal dispute resolution” 
of citations with which they disagree.43 Those processes vary considerably 
                                                                                                                                      
 38. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(b) (1994), 488.438 (2016). (A surveyor can cite 
noncompliance that does not “have the potential for more than minimal harm”—the lowest 
score on CMS’ ‘severity” and “scope” grid—which does not support imposition of any 
sanction.). 
 39. The CMS training course consists of various “modules,” and so, for instance, a social 
worker might pass the “nursing” module, and thus be “qualified” to evaluate and cite 
noncompliance regarding complicated clinical issues, which can be the basis for disputes and 
appeals. See STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 37, at §§ 4009 et seq. 
 40. In a typical recent decision, the Board imposed a civil money penalty in excess of $1.4 
million against a nursing facility where a nurse surveyor disagreed with an order a resident’s 
physician – who was not even a facility employee—had given limiting anesthesia for oral 
surgery that had resulted in the surgery being delayed. Putnam Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2850 
(2018). Board and ALJ decisions are reported on the Board’s website, 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab/index.html. 
 41. See DHHS OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., TRENDS IN NURSING HOME DEFICIENCIES AND 
COMPLAINTS, OIG REPORT NO. OEI-02-08-00140 (September 18, 2008), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-08-00140.pdf. The overall trends in recent years have 
been similar, although the average number of deficiencies per facility varies considerably from 
state to state, a result the OIG and the Government Accountability Office have criticized for 
many years. 
 42. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.300(a) (1994); (a)(1)(D) (1994); 488.408(f) (2016).  
 43. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331 (2011). 
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from state to state, from internal rubber-stamps, to informal hearings after 
which hearing officers may set aside inappropriate citations.  
The Social Security Act and CMS’ “Enforcement Regulations” then set 
forth an “enforcement” system that authorizes CMS to impose sanctions 
(known as “remedies”) for noncompliance, including civil money penalties 
(“CMPs”) as high as $20,628 per day of noncompliance (which can total 
millions of dollars);44 denials of payment for new Medicare/Medicaid 
admissions (which can starve a facility);45 temporary third-party 
management;46 state monitoring;47 directed plans of correction;48 directed 
training;49and ultimately, “termination” from the Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs (which usually operates as a regulatory death sentence).50 As noted 
above, CMS manuals set forth an elaborate system of classifying violations by 
“severity” and “scope,” and for matching various categories of violations to 
specific remedies, although the regulations also accord CMS considerable 
discretion regarding imposition of remedies.51 In most cases, the SSA 
recommends, and CMS imposes, the remedy. Sometimes, a “Plan of 
Correction” and SSA “revisit” to assure compliance is all that CMS requires 
to address and correct relatively minor deficiencies. However, at the other 
extreme, in about 2% of cases, CMS imposes enhanced CMPs running into 
the millions of dollars for violations that pose “immediate jeopardy” to 
                                                                                                                                      
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h) (2014); 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.430 et seq. (2011). The same statutory 
provision authorizes all of the remedies discussed in the text. Note that 42 C.F.R. § 488.436(b) 
provides for an automatic reduction of the CMP of 35% if the facility waives an appeal; in 
effect, this provision puts a 35% penalty on choosing to appeal and gives CMS a 35% cushion 
when negotiating settlement. (The regulation also provides for a 50% reduction in certain 
circumstances where a facility self-reports a serious violation, but that provision is employed 
very rarely.). 
 45. 42 C.F.R. § 488.417 (1995).  
 46. 42 C.F.R. § 488.415 (1994). 
 47. 42 C.F.R. § 488.422 (1995). 
 48. 42 C.F.R. § 488.424 (1994). 
 49. 42 C.F.R. § 488.425 (1995). 
 50. 42 C.F.R. § 488.456 (1994). 
 51. 42 C.F.R. § 488.408 (2016). Subsection 408(g)(2) specifically provides that a facility 
may not appeal the “choice of remedy.” Remedies actually are imposed by CMS’ ten Regional 
Offices, whose philosophies and practices differ considerably. For instance, some Regional 
Office officials impose very large CMPs, while others believe that CMPs take resources from 
resident care, and so focus on, say, directed plans of correction. Over the years, the DHHS 
Office of Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office have issued numerous 
reports critical of this inconsistency, which persists, and vividly illustrates the difficulty of 
imposing procedural limits even inside an agency. 
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resident health and safety, defined as noncompliance that “has caused or is 
likely to cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a resident.”52  
The Social Security Act provides that where CMS makes an adverse 
finding, a facility is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before a neutral 
administrative law judge to challenge the factual and legal bases for the 
sanction.53 In 1994, CMS adopted regulations at 42 C.F.R. Part 498 that 
provide for a trial-type adjudication before an Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) of what is now called the “Departmental Appeals Board” (“DAB” or 
“Board”), to effectuate that right. At any given time, there are about half a 
dozen ALJs who hear appeals in nursing facility cases (as well as appeals of 
many other DHHS actions).54    
Many courts have held that because Congress provided no express 
exemption from the APA, the usual APA standards govern these Part 498 
proceedings.55 The most basic “adjudication” rule under the APA is that the 
“proponent of an order,” in this case, CMS, has the burden of proof to sustain 
the order throughout a proceeding contesting the order.56 Thus, in their 
earliest cases under Part 498, the Secretary’s ALJs and the courts recognized 
that CMS had the burden under Part 498 to come forward with evidence to 
support any factual allegations (or, as CMS calls them, “findings”) that CMS 
identified as the “basis” for a sanction. The Secretary’s ALJs and the courts 
also recognized that if the agency failed to do so, then the petitioner prevailed 
“even if it offers no evidence at all.”57 If CMS established a “prima facie case” 
of noncompliance (which no regulation defines, but which the Board 
                                                                                                                                      
 52. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2017). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii) (2014) (incorporating by reference 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7a).  
 54. See Dep’t Appeals Bd. (DAB), Who Are the Board Members & Judges?, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab. 
 55. See, e.g., Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations, LLC v. Dept. of Health and Human 
Serv., 742 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2014); Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Grace Healthcare of Benton v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 589 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2009); 
Liberty Commons—Johnston v. Leavitt, 241 Fed. Appx. 76 (4th Cir. 2007); Beechwood 
Restorative Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 494 F. Supp. 2d 181 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). See Dickinson v. 
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (APA intended to provide uniform standard of review for agency 
actions; Congress contemplated no judicial “rubber stamp” of such actions); W. Va. Dep’t of 
Health v. Sebelius, 649 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Section 706(2)(A) to review Board 
decision); S.C. Health & Human Servs. Finance Comm’n v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 
1990) (applying Sec. 706(2)(A) standard following hearing by comparable DHHS appeals 
board).  
 56. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1990); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); Universal Camera 
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).  
 57. Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB No. 1611 (1997), aff’d, No. 98-3789 (D. N.J. 1999). 
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basically says means allegations, which, if true, could support a finding of 
noncompliance58), the burden then shifted to the petitioner to demonstrate 
compliance with the regulation in question, typically by showing that its 
staff’s actions met applicable standards of care, or by an affirmative defense 
(typically that a resident had refused care) or that an adverse outcome was 
clinically unavoidable (for instance, the natural progression of a disease 
process). These principles became known as the “Hillman rule,” after the case 
in which the Board first described them.  
As outlined below, the Board has no generally applicable procedural rules 
(other than for ministerial matters such as numbering of exhibits and the 
like), so the ALJs establish their own hearing procedures.59 For example, 
some ALJs require submission of “written direct testimony” before the 
hearing, while others prefer to hear witnesses testify live. Hearings can take 
anywhere from a few hours to several days, again, depending on an individual 
ALJ’s preferences. Hearsay is admissible, but different ALJs accord different 
weight to such evidence. In recent years, budget restrictions have required 
ALJs to conduct hearings by videoconference (in the past the ALJ would 
travel to a location near the appealing facility). The Board also has limited the 
number of hearings, causing a significant backlog, also because of budget 
issues. Thus, the number of ALJ and Board Decisions on the merits in 
nursing facility appeals has dropped dramatically from fifty or more per year 
to only a handful today, about half of which ALJs now decide by “summary 
judgment” in favor of CMS (that is, without a hearing).60 
Following the hearing (or summary judgment motion), an ALJ must issue 
a written decision,61 and the losing party can request review by a three-
member panel of the Board.62 The Board rarely entertains even oral 
argument, almost always upholds CMS sanctions, and almost always reverses 
every ALJ Decision in favor of a facility.63 
                                                                                                                                      
 58. For instance, the Board sometimes holds that the allegations in a Statement of 
Deficiencies, without more, are sufficient to establish CMS’ “prima facie case,” and to shift the 
burden of demonstrating compliance to the petitioner. See Southpark Meadows Nursing & 
Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2703 (2016). 
 59. The Board’s general rules are at 42 C.F.R. pt. 498 (2008). 
 60. Board and ALJ decisions are available on the Board’s website, 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab/index.html, and some are reported by commercial 
services. 
 61. 42 C.F.R. § 498.74 (1996). 
 62. 42 C.F.R. § 498.80 (1996). 
 63. The author has tracked all ALJ. and Board decisions for about twenty years. Before 
2010, nursing facilities won about one-third of ALJ decisions on the merits, and CMS rarely 
appealed adverse decisions to the Board. Since 2010—when the Board changed its review 
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Judicial review of Board Decisions is bifurcated: appeals of CMPs go 
directly to the Court of Appeals and appeals of other sanctions to the District 
Court.64 The courts apply the traditional review standard of Section 
706(2)(A) of the APA, that is, the agency action will be set aside if “arbitrary, 
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”65 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a, 
which governs appeals of civil monetary penalties, also provides that the 
standard of review of the Board’s findings of fact following an evidentiary 
hearing is “substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole.” 
IV. THE BOARD’S CURRENT APPLICATION OF THESE STANDARDS 
In recent years, the Board’s administrative review process has rejected 
virtually every aspect of the APA and has taken on a life of its own. The Board 
largely has abandoned the Hillman rule described above, and now says that 
it is not bound by APA standards, even though Congress has provided no 
such exemption. The background for this rejection is murky, as neither the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, nor the Board, has ever explained 
it in any official statement.  
For instance, the Board has held in a series of cases over the past ten years 
that it now considers all of the allegations in a “Statement of Deficiencies”—
including those a petitioner contests—to be “presumptively correct,” and that 
a petitioner bears the burden throughout the proceeding somehow to 
                                                                                                                                      
standard, discussed in the text—the number of ALJ decisions that completely set aside all 
deficiencies and remedies has declined to only a handful a year, and during that time the Board 
has reversed every ALJ decision in favor of a facility that CMS has appealed.  
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2018); 42 C.F.R. § 498.90 (1996). 
 65. See, e.g., Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 742 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2014); Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Grace Healthcare of Benton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 589 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2009); 
Liberty Commons—Johnston v. Leavitt, 241 Fed. Appx. 76 (4th Cir. 2007). See Dickinson v. 
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (APA intended to provide uniform standard of review for agency 
actions; Congress contemplated no judicial “rubber stamp” of such actions); W. Va. Dep’t of 
Health v. Sebelius, 649 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Sec. 706(2)(A) to review Board 
decision); S.C. Health & Human Servs. Finance Comm’n v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 
1990) (applying Section 706(2)(A) standard following hearing by comparable DHHS appeals 
board).  
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“persuade” the Board otherwise.66 This position would seem directly to 
conflict with Section 556(d) of the APA.67 
The Board also has stated that it considers ALJ and Board review to be “de 
novo,” and that it is not “restricted to the facts and evidence that were 
available to CMS when it made its decision,” nor “how or why CMS decided 
to impose remedies,” nor even the record developed in the Part 498 hearing. 
According to the Board’s latest cases, it says it views the Part 498 review 
process not to provide petitioners independent review of agency actions, but 
only to provide an opportunity for the Board to act as “the final step in the 
enforcement process,” and even to “fix” flawed CMS or ALJ determinations.68 
Thus, the Board now specifically holds that its review of ALJ decisions is not 
comparable to the independent “oversight role of a federal court in reviewing 
agency decisions to determine if an adequate basis is articulated.”69 Not 
incidentally, following its abandonment of the Hillman rule, the Board has 
reversed every ALJ Decision in favor of a nursing facility that CMS has 
appealed to it.70 No court has directly addressed most aspects of the Board’s 
movement away from APA standards—at least not yet.71 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. See, e.g., Southgate Meadows Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2703 (2016); 
St. Joseph Villa v. CMS, DAB No. 2210 (2008) (reversing summary judgment for a petitioner 
where CMS relied only on the Statement of Deficiencies and offered no supporting evidence); 
Barbourville Nursing Home v. CMS, DAB No. 1962 (2005). 
 67. In a typical description of the Board’s current iteration of the parties’ respective 
burdens, the Board will uphold CMS sanctions where a petitioner does not “demonstrate that 
the ALJ’s findings were not based on substantial evidence.” Plott Nursing Home v. CMS, DAB 
No. 2426 (2011) (emphasis added).  
 68. As a result, the Board frequently constructs “post hoc rationalizations” for CMS 
sanctions—that is, articulates a different basis for a sanction than the agency itself stated (and 
the petitioner challenged—exactly what the Supreme Court held the APA prohibits in Citizens 
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970). In the few cases that address this 
point, the Board says that Overton Park applies only to judicial review, not its review. 
 69. Golden Living Ctr.—Riverchase v. CMS, DAB No. 2314 (2010); Beatrice St. Dev. Ctr. 
v. CMS, DAB No. 2311 (2010); Britthaven of Chapel Hill v. CMS, DAB No. 2284 (2009); Cal 
Turner Extended Care Pavilion v. CMS, DAB No. 2030 (2006). 
 70. The Board does occasionally reverse an ALJ summary judgment in favor of CMS 
where the petitioner shows that the ALJ did not address and resolve material factual disputes 
(while Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not directly apply to Board proceedings, the Board does say that 
it applies Rule 56 principles to summary judgment motions). 
 71. The court in Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.2d 975, 985-89 (9th Cir. 2015), 
held that because unaddressed citations of noncompliance can and do have continuing 
enforcement consequences (for instance, CMS can and does rely on a facility’s enforcement 
history when choosing sanctions), an ALJ cannot decline to review every deficiency that a 
petitioner contests simply because he or she states that he or she could sustain the sanction on 
the basis of a subset of all the citations. The Board rejects this analysis, and applies it, if at all, 
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In fact, as discussed immediately below, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services has long tried to limit review of CMS enforcement decisions, 
and the Board usually has accommodated that effort, beginning with the 
threshold issue of what enforcement determinations are appealable. One 
recent development has accelerated that effort. Until recently CMS was 
authorized to collect CMPs only after the conclusion of an appeal,72 but in 
2010, as part of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Congress authorized CMS 
to adopt regulations that “may” provide for collection or “escrow” of CMPs 
pending appeals.73 In 2012 CMS proposed a draft regulation, now codified at 
42 C.F.R. § 488.431(b), to implement this ACA provision. CMS explained its 
rationale for the regulation in a lengthy official comment in which it noted a 
series of reports by the Government Accountability Office and the DHHS 
Inspector General that expressed concerns about “delays in payment of a civil 
money penalty” (in fact, the cited reports actually critiqued delays by CMS in 
processing survey documents and collecting CMPs after the completion of 
appeals). But CMS also recited that the agency’s goal was “to eliminate a 
facility’s ability to significantly defer the direct financial effect of an 
applicable CMP until after an often long litigation process,” which CMS 
specifically derided as a distraction from its enforcement prerogatives.74  
CMS’ rationale for this rule is curious at best, for the Supreme Court has 
held that the government may seize money or property prior to a hearing in 
non-criminal cases only in “extraordinary situations where some valid 
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until 
after the event.”75 Nevertheless, CMS dismissed commenters’ concerns about 
the due process implications of seizing CMPs without prior administrative 
                                                                                                                                      
only to cases originating in states that comprise the Ninth Circuit. Similarly, as noted below, a 
District Court in Nebraska ordered the Board to hold a hearing in a case in which CMS had 
withdrawn a remedy and argued that the case therefore did not trigger the right to a Part 498 
hearing. Again, the Board disagrees, and has refused to schedule the hearing the court ordered. 
Golden Living Ctr.—Grand Island Lakeview v. CMS, No. 8:11CV119 (D. Neb. Dec. 16, 2011) 
(reversing DAB No. 2364 (2011). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(5) (2010) formerly provided that only denials of payment and 
temporary managers “may be imposed during the pendency of any hearing;”42 C.F.R. §§ 
488.440(b) (2012), 488.442(a)(1) (2011), read together, formerly provided that civil monetary 
penalties were payable fifteen days after a “final administrative decision” regarding a CMP. 
The Affordable Care Act amended Sec. 1395i-3(h)(5) to add authority to collect CMPs during 
pendency of the hearing. 
 73. Sec. 6111(a)(1) of the Affordable Care Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-
3(h)(2)(b)(ii)(IV) (2014). 
 74. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Civil Money Penalties for Nursing Homes, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 15106 (Mar. 18, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 488). 
 75. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993).  
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or judicial review, stating in its Official Comment that it would create a new 
“independent informal dispute resolution process” (“IIDR”), in which 
sanctioned parties could dispute deficiencies prior to, or as an alternative to 
the appeal process. Congress thus provided IIDR as a due process 
counterweight to escrow—the provisions are in the same statutory section—
but CMS routinely disregards or rejects IIDR recommendations in favor of 
facilities.  
The agency’s efforts to limit challenges to its enforcement decisions also 
has been baked into its regulations. The administrative and judicial review 
provisions of the Social Security Act appear, on their face, to allow challenges 
to any enforcement determination or decision by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services.76 But CMS’ appeal regulations, and the Board’s 
interpretation and application of those regulations, erect significant 
substantive limits on administrative appeals.77 
Most importantly, the Secretary has implemented regulations that appear 
to contradict the plain language of the statute that allows appeals of all 
Secretarial adverse actions. 42 C.F.R. § 498.3 provides, the Board consistently 
holds, that a facility may appeal only certain “initial determinations,” which 
the Board defines to mean a finding of noncompliance that results in the 
imposition of any enforcement remedy, but not the underlying deficiency itself 
if CMS imposes no remedy.78 Thus, there is no right to appeal an adverse 
informal dispute resolution decision;79 or an SSA or CMS rejection of a Plan 
of Correction (even if that result leads to termination, which would be 
appealable);80 or an SSA recommendation of a sanction.81  
                                                                                                                                      
 76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(e), (g) and (h) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii) (2014) 
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a).  
 77. 42 C.F.R. § 498 (2008) (especially 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(2012)). 
 78. The Secretary argued in her briefs and oral argument in Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long 
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000), that deficiencies could be appealed one way or another (for 
instance, by accepting a small civil monetary penalty), and the Court specifically referred to 
that representation in requiring that all such challenges must be “channeled” through the 
Board. A federal district court suggested in Golden Living Ctr.—Grand Island Lakeview v. 
CMS, No. 8:11CV119 (D. Neb. Dec. 16, 2011) (reversing DAB No. 2364 (2011), which found 
that if the Board declines to conduct any review of an enforcement determination, then a court 
might accept such an appeal on the merits in the first instance.). But the Board rejects that 
analysis and has disregarded the Court’s Order (seven years later the Board has not reassigned 
the case to an ALJ).    
 79. 42 C.F.R. § 488.331 (2011); see, e.g., Cap. Home Nursing and Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB 
No. 2252 (June 10, 2009). 
 80. Great Lakes Healthcare v. CMS, A.L.J. Ruling No. 2016-14, 1-2 (July 25, 2016). 
 81. See Glenoaks Convalescent Hosp. v. CMS, A.L.J Ruling No. CR4805, 1-3 (March 7, 
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4805.pdf; Bruceville Terrace v. CMS, 
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The Board also interprets Section 498.3 to mean that facilities may appeal 
only remedies that persist through the appeal, and not the imposition of the 
remedy itself. Thus, if CMS imposes but then withdraws a remedy, even 
during the course of an otherwise properly perfected appeal (typically 
because CMS fears it might lose on the merits), the Board will dismiss the 
appeal. The Board consistently holds that the facility’s right to appeal even an 
egregiously wrong violation is thereby vitiated, and so the citation remains 
on the facility’s public record.82   
  The Board has also held that, notwithstanding the statutory language 
that any “affected party” may contest an adverse enforcement determination, 
only active Medicare providers may initiate appeals of enforcement 
determinations, even if the facility nevertheless is “affected by” the 
determination. Thus, the Board has held that a Medicaid-only facility may 
not appeal termination of its Medicaid Provider Agreement (unless CMS 
itself terminated the Agreement).83 Likewise, the Board has held that a 
Medicare certified facility that for some reason has an inactive Medicare 
Provider number may not appeal an enforcement action.84 The Board 
recently dismissed an appeal because the party filing the appeal could not 
                                                                                                                                      
A.L.J. Ruling No. 2016-8, at 1-2 (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2016/alj2016-8.pdf.  
 82. There are dozens of cases illustrating this point. See, e.g., Fountain Lake Health & 
Rehab. Ctr. v, CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1985 (July 6, 2005), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2005/dab1985.htm; Arcadia Acres, Inc. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1607 (Jan. 20, 
1997), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/1997/dab1607.html; Sunset Villa v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1683 (Nov. 2, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1683.pdf; 
Gulf Pointe Specialty Hosp. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1651 (Sep. 17, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1651.pdf; 
Grace Care Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1647 ( Sep. 14, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1647.pdf; 
Colonial Oaks Guest Care Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1618 (June 29, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1618.pdf; 
Corpus Christi Nursing & Rehab. V. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1616 (June 26, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1616.pdf; 
Twin Pines Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1601 (May 25, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1601.pdf; 
Heritage Manor of Franklinton v. HCFA, ALJ Dec. No. CR666 (May 2, 2000), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2000/cr666.html. 
 83. Bryn Mawr Care v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2277, 1-2 (Nov. 1, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2277.pdf. 
 84. Guild Home for the Aged Blind v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2437, 1-2, 5-7, 9 (Sep. 26, 
2011), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-
decisions/2011/cr2437.pdf. 
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show that it actually controlled the facility at the time it initiated the appeal.85 
CMS once successfully persuaded a Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal of 
a CMP where a successor operator paid the penalty, even though the 
petitioner would have received a refund had it prevailed.86 
The Board also consistently holds that ALJs have very limited authority. 
The Board says that ALJs do not have the authority to enter stays or 
injunctions,87 to review whether a regulation is consistent with the governing 
statute,88 to review CMS’ choice of remedy (e.g., an ALJ cannot decide that a 
deficiency exists but warrants only a CMP and not termination),89 to review 
IDR determinations,90 to review claims of bias,91 to review constitutional 
claims,92 or to review CMS’ failure to promulgate its survey and enforcement 
policies via the “notice and comment” provisions of the APA.93 In a recent 
case, an ALJ set aside a survey finding on the ground that the survey team did 
not include a registered nurse, which the statute and regulations specifically 
require; the Board reversed that Decision on the ground that an ALJ may not 
                                                                                                                                      
 85. Sunview Care & Rehab Ctr. LLC, DAB Dec. No. 2713, 1 (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2016/dab2713.pdf. 
 86. Jennifer Matthew Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. DHHS, 607 F.3d 951 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 87. See, e.g., Palm Grove Convalescent Ctr. v. HCFA, ALJ Docket No. C-99-12 (1999) 
(unreported). 
 88. See, Dir. of the Office for Civil Rights v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., ALJ 
Dec. No. CR5111, 3 (June 1, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr5111.pdf. 
 89. See, e.g., Beverly Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1696 (July 1, 1999), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/1999/dab1696.htm; Aase Haugen Homes, Inc. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1273 (Jan. 
31, 2005), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-
decisions/2005/CR1273.htm. 
 90. Rutland Nursing Home v. CMS, ALJ Ruling 2014-12, 5 (November 8, 2013), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2013/alj2014-
12.pdf. 
 91. Jewish Home of E. Pa. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2421, 5-6 (Aug. 30, 2011), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/cr2421.pdf. 
 92. Carrington Place of Muscatine v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2321, 23-24 (June 25, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2321.pdf. 
 93. See, e.g., Orchard Grove Extended Care Ctr. v. HCFA, ALJ Dec. No. CR541, 3, 5 (July 
20, 1998), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-
decisions/1998/cr541.PDF; Green Oaks Hosp. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR861 (Jan. 28, 2002), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2002/cr861.html.  
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consider violations of the survey process where there are otherwise 
appropriate citations.94  
The Board does permit appeals that challenge only the duration of 
noncompliance (and thus the duration of a “per diem” CMP). In other words, 
a petitioner can concede noncompliance but offer evidence and argument 
that it resumed compliance on an earlier date than CMS says, and so the per 
diem penalty likewise should end sooner than CMS found.95 It also 
theoretically possible for a petitioner to concede noncompliance but argue 
that any deficiency did not pose the risk of more than minimal harm and thus 
cannot support a sanction.96 
While not strictly an APA issue, the Board’s regulations require that a 
nursing facility must file its “Request for Hearing” within 60 calendar days 
after receipt of the CMS Notice imposing a remedy—not within 60 days after 
the effective date of the remedy.97 This can be very problematic where a 
facility receives a Notice imposing a remedy that will become effective at a 
future date if the facility does not correct a deficiency and resume compliance 
before that date, because the Board says that the 60 days runs from the receipt 
of the Notice even in such a case (when the appeal may wind up being moot). 
There are dozens of decisions dismissing appeals where the facility misses 
this deadline by even one day.98 While the regulation does provide that the 
Board may extend this deadline upon a showing of “good cause”—the Board 
has held that CMS does not have such authority99—the Board has conceded 
that it never has defined “good cause,” and there never has been a case where 
an ALJ or the Board has found that any circumstance constitutes “good 
cause” for extending the filing deadline.100  
                                                                                                                                      
 94. Avon Nursing Home v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2830, 10-11 (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2830.pdf, rev’g Dallas Home Health Care, 
Inc. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. 4760 (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-
cr4760.pdf.  
 95. See, e.g., Libertyville Manor Rehab. & Health Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2849 
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2849.pdf. 
 96. 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(b), 488.438; supra n. 38. 
 97. 42 C.F.R. § 498.40(a)(2). 
 98. Knox County Nursing Home v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR1588, 3 (Apr. 19, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2007/cr1588.pdf 
(two days late).  
 99. West Side House LTC Facility v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2791, 7 (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2791.pdf. 
 100. Brookside Rehab. & Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2094 (June 27, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2007/dab2094.pdf. Some fact patterns illustrate fairly extreme circumstances, such 
as the case of a physician whose Medicare exclusion appeal was dismissed notwithstanding his 
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Whether a particular set of facts constitutes noncompliance is a mixed 
question of fact and law: whether the agency’s allegations are accurate and 
complete, and whether the regulatory provision reaches the alleged act or 
omission. However, the Board resists the notion that the legal part of the 
analysis consists of “elements” similar to civil or criminal claims.101 Likewise, 
the Board allows ALJs to infer more general violations, for instance, “neglect,” 
“inadequate administration,” or failure of “quality assurance,” solely from a 
violation of a more specific requirement.102  
The Board also allows an ALJ to grant summary disposition in favor of 
CMS without stating that he or she even considered a petitioner’s evidence.103 
The Board recites that the familiar standard of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 “guides” its consideration of summary judgment motions104—
                                                                                                                                      
argument that he never received the applicable notice because he was in jail; the Board held 
that he did not overcome the “presumption” that he received the notice three days after it was 
mailed. Kenneth Schrager, DAB Dec. No. 2366, 1-2, 5 (May 15, 2011), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2011/dab2366.pdf. For what it is worth, attorney error (divorce, etc.) is not “good 
cause.” Heritage Park Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2028, 4 (Nov. 12, 2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2009/CR2028.pdf. 
See also Ada Care Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Ruling 2014-10 (Nov. 4, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2013/alj2014-
10.pdf; Parkside Surgery Inst. V. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2319 (Feb. 9, 2011), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/cr2319.pdf.  
 101. Thus, for instance, the Board says that it is immaterial if CMS cites the wrong 
regulatory provision if it can derive any other basis for noncompliance from the record. See, 
e.g., Avalon Place Trinity v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2819 (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2819.pdf; Kindred Transitional Care & 
Rehab.—Greenfield, DAB Dec. No. 2792 (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2792.pdf. 
 102. See, e.g., Heritage Place Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2829 (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2829.pdf. 
 103. No ALJ ever has granted summary judgment in favor of a facility. In the past, ALJs 
regularly ruled that where CMS failed to offer a prima facie case of noncompliance on one or 
another citation under Hillman, the petitioner did not have to defend such citations. Now, 
while some ALJs entertain the equivalent of a Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion 
of CMS’ case, even those who do so will reserve decision, usually on the ground that 42 C.F.R. 
§ 498.63 provides CMS the right to file a written brief on any citation it alleges. Some ALJs 
even allow CMS to argue citations for the first time in briefs for which they have offered no 
evidence—and thus no prima facie case of noncompliance—at the hearing. See, e.g., Donelson 
Place Care & Rehab. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR5132 (2018) (sustaining a citation for which 
CMS offered no evidence). 
 104. Cedar Lake Nursing Home, DAB Dec. No. 2344, 2 (Nov. 18, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2344.pdf (holding that Rule 56 does not govern its proceedings, but only 
provides “guidance”). There are actually many judicial decisions that recite that administrative 
248 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:223 
 
that is, that the party seeking summary judgment must offer evidence 
regarding every element of the claim in question, the evidence must be 
construed against the party seeking summary judgment, and all inferences 
that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence must be resolved against the 
moving party.105 But the Board actually does not follow this rule in practice. 
For instance, the Board does not follow the usual rule courts apply in 
administrative enforcement cases that an unsworn charging document (the 
Statement of Deficiencies) is not considered to be “evidence” for purposes of 
Rule 56. This is because granting summary judgment on the basis of such 
unsworn allegations has the effect of reversing the burdens of production and 
proof established by the Rule.106 In fact, ALJs routinely draw inferences for 
purposes of summary judgment against facilities, even where CMS offers 
nothing beyond the Statement of Deficiencies.107 There are numerous 
Decisions in which ALJs reject the opinions of expert affiants, medical 
journals, and the like, as insufficient to create material issues of fact.108 The 
Board does occasionally reverse ALJ Decisions granting summary judgment 
to CMS,109 but there is no pattern to such cases, and it also frequently affirms 
                                                                                                                                      
agencies that employ summary proceedings must follow Rule 56. Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. 
Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 747 (6th Cir. 2004) (DAB case); see also, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct 
& Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 604-607 (1st Cir. 1994); Veg-Mix, Inc. v. USDA, 832 F.2d 
601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. FERC, 806 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
See generally CHARLES KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.42 (2d. ed. 1997).  
 105. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-252 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 586-7 (1986).  
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Menendez, 48 F.3d 1401, 1414 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 107. See, e.g., Life Care Ctr. of Merrimack Valley v. CMS, CR4965 (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4965.pdf. 
 108. See, e.g., Senior Rehab. & Skilled Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2300, 5 (Jan. 29, 
2010), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2300.pdf; Oak Ridge Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4865, 6-7 (June 13, 
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4865.pdf. 
 109. See, e.g., NMS Healthcare of Hagerstown v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2803, 1 (July 20, 
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab2803.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. 
CR3772 (2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-
decisions/2015/cr3772.pdf (notably holding that even if CMS’ evidence establishes a prima 
facie case of noncompliance, that is not sufficient to support summary judgment); Grace 
Living Ctr.—Nw. OKC v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2633, 1 (Apr. 17, 2015), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2015/dab2633.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR3347 (2014), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2014/cr3347.pdf; 
Hanover Hill Health Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2507 (Apr. 10, 2013), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
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summary disposition even when the petitioner contests the accuracy of CMS’ 
material factual allegations. 
If a case does proceed to hearing—perhaps 10% of filed cases do so—CMS 
at least theoretically bears the initial burden of proceeding. That is, the agency 
must offer evidence regarding each element of each allegation of 
noncompliance the petitioner disputes in order to establish a “prima facie 
case” of noncompliance.110 As noted, the Board specifically held in its seminal 
                                                                                                                                      
decisions/2013/dab2507.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR2617 (2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2012/cr2617.pdf; 
Pleasant View Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2488, 1 (Dec. 6, 2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2012/dab2488.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR2546 (2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2012/cr2546.pdf; 
Elant at Fishkill, DAB Dec. No. 2468, 1-2 (July 11, 2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2012/dab2468.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR2465 (2011), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/cr2465.pdf; 
Va. Highlands Health Rehab. Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2339, 1 (Sep. 30, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2339.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR2083 (2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2083ok.pdf; 
Holy Cross Vill. at Notre Dame, Inc., v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2291, 1 (Dec. 21, 2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2009/dab2291.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR1951 (2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2009/CR1951.pdf; 
Ill. Knights Templar Home v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2274, 1 (Sep. 30, 2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2009/dab2274.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR1879 (2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2009/CR1879.pdf; 
St. Catherine’s Care Ctr. of Findlay, Inc., v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1964 (Feb. 25, 2005), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2005/dab1964.htm, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR1190 (2004), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2004/CR1190.htm; 
Lebanon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1918 (April 19, 2004), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2004/dab1918.html, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR1069 (2003), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2003/CR1069.html. 
 110. See Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1611 (Feb. 28, 1997), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/1997/dab1611.html, aff’d, Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, No. 98-3789 (D.N.J. May 
13, 1999) (unpublished opinion); Cross Creek Health Care Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1665 
(July 14, 1998), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/1998/dab1665.html. At least one old Board decision indicated that CMS had the 
burden to offer evidence regarding each deficiency it presses at the hearing (or else 
unsupported citations would be set aside). See W. Care Mgmt. Corp. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 
1921 (May 10, 2004), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
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Hillman case that if CMS fails to meet this burden, then the petitioner 
prevails even if it offers no evidence at all.  
However, the Board’s application of this rule is at best unclear. First, as 
noted above, the Board does not allow an ALJ to render the equivalent of a 
directed verdict after CMS’ case, thus essentially vitiating that aspect of 
Hillman.111 
Second, as discussed above, the APA provides that the “proponent of a 
rule or order” bears the burden to sustain that order, but the Board has held, 
variously, that it is not subject to the APA rules regarding burdens of proof 
at all. Or, if the Board addresses APA burdens at all, it says that it is the 
petitioner who is the “proponent of an order” relieving it of the sanction—
which obviously is not the intent of Section 556(d)—and so the petitioner 
bears the burden of “persuasion” that it was in compliance with whatever 
regulation is at issue.112  
Thus, in some recent cases, the Board has absolved CMS from coming 
forward with anything at a hearing beyond the Statement of Deficiencies 
(which, the Board says, can be taken as “evidence” of its contents), and thus it 
is the petitioner’s burden to disprove CMS’ allegations.113 As noted above, 
                                                                                                                                      
decisions/2004/dab1921.html. However, the Board now says that it can uphold a sanction if 
CMS manages to offer a prima facie case on any cited deficiency, and that the remaining 
citations simply will remain on the record, with the petitioner’s challenge undecided. Plott 
Nursing Home v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2426 (Dec. 6, 2011), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2011/dab2426.pdf. 
 111. Although, the Board does require that the petitioner nevertheless make a motion to 
that effect on the ground that CMS failed to demonstrate a prima facie case, or else the 
argument is deemed waived.  
 112. See, e.g., Batavia Nursing & Convalescent Inn v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1911 (Mar. 1, 
2004), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2004/dab1911.html.  
 113. See, e.g., Southpark Meadows Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2703 (May 20, 
2016), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2016/dab-2703.pdf. The application of this rule is demonstrated in cases such as 
Golden Living Ctr.—Riverchase v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. CR2012 (Sept. 30, 2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2314.pdf, rev’ing ALJ Dec. No. 2012 (2009), in which an ALJ held that CMS 
had failed to establish a prima facie case of noncompliance where CMS’ witnesses could not 
explain how a resident fell or suffered an injury during a transfer, but the Board reversed and 
held that it was the facility’s burden to demonstrate that its staff had not violated any 
regulation.  
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ALJs will sometimes sustain deficiencies even where CMS offers no evidence 
beyond a Statement of Deficiencies.114  
The Board has also held that CMS has no burden to produce any specific 
evidence to support an “immediate jeopardy” determination—even though 
the plain language of the regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 488.301, recites specific 
elements: noncompliance that “has caused or is likely to cause death or serious 
harm.” Likewise, the Board holds that it is the petitioner’s burden to 
demonstrate that the determination is “clearly erroneous.”115 Some poorly 
worded Board Decisions even suggest that some ALJs apply this rule to find 
a “presumption” in favor of the merits of any “immediate jeopardy” citation 
as well.116 
At the same time, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e), which governs appeals of 
CMPs, specifically provides that the standard of review of a determination of 
noncompliance is the traditional “substantial evidence in the record, taken as 
a whole,” with factual disputes determined by a “preponderance of the 
evidence.” The Board’s “Guidelines for Review” provide that the same 
standard governs the administrative review.117  
Again, however, the Board does not follow these rules. First, it typically 
says that it requires only “substantial evidence” to uphold CMS “findings” 
(allegations), which is a far lower standard than the statute actually requires, 
and which allows an ALJ to disregard a facility’s evidence supporting a factual 
or legal defense.118 Thus, in recent cases, ALJs have rejected clinicians’ 
                                                                                                                                      
 114. See, e.g., Donelson Place Care & Rehab. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR5132 (2018); Life 
Care Ctr. of Merrimack Valley v. CMS, CR4965 (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4965.pdf. 
 115. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301; see, e.g., Daughters of Miriam Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2067 
(Feb. 9, 2007), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2007/dab2067.pdf (holding that the Social Security Act prohibits CMS from offering 
evidence in support of an “immediate jeopardy” determination).  
 116. See, e.g., Century Care of Crystal Coast v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2076 (April 10, 2007), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2007/dab2076.pdf, aff’ing ALJ Dec. No. CR1488 (2006). 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e); The courts do agree with this rule. See, e.g., Woodstock Care 
Ctr. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 118. According to one court: 
 
There is a notable difference between “substantial evidence” and “substantial 
evidence in the record as a whole.” “Substantial evidence” is merely such 
“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.” “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole,” however, requires 
a more scrutinizing analysis. In the review of an administrative decision, “the 
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly 
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reliance on formal clinical standards promulgated by professional 
organizations such as the American Diabetes Association and the American 
Medical Directors Association as “irrelevant” to CMS’ enforcement 
prerogatives.119 They have rejected considering the findings and analysis of 
State ALJs in parallel State appeals (even though the Supreme Court has held 
that federal administrative agencies must apply “issue preclusion” rules such 
as res judicata and collateral estoppel to prior state decisions).120 They now 
routinely second-guess clinical decisions by residents’ physicians, 
pharmacists and other professionals, and then impute liability for such 
“errors” to facilities.121 They have based sanctions on critiques of apparently 
unremarkable facility policies.122  
More importantly, the Board has stated in several recent Decisions that it 
considers ALJ and Board review of both CMS’ factual allegations and legal 
conclusions to be “de novo.”123 As noted above, the Board says that it does 
not consider its review “restricted to the facts and evidence that were available 
to CMS when it made its decision,” nor “how or why CMS decided to impose 
                                                                                                                                      
detracts from its weight.” Thus the court must also take into consideration the 
weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence that 
is contradictory. 
Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 
 119. See, e.g., Oak Ridge Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4865 (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4865.pdf. 
 120. See, e.g., Rockcastle Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4926 (Aug. 17, 
2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4926.pdf. Compare Astoria Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Solomino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 
461 (1982); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); United States v. Utah Constr. 
& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Stallings v. Goshen Dairy Stores, Inc., 89 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 
1998); E. Food & Liquor, Inc. v. United States, 50 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1995); Darden v. Ill. Bell 
Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Ky. Cabinet for Human Res., 774 F.2d 
1162 (6th Cir. 1985).  
 121. See, e.g., Golden Living Ctr.—Superior, DAB Dec. No. 2768 (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab2768. (The facility violated regulation by 
following the Medical Director’s decision—following a specific State guideline—not to order 
prophylactic Tamiflu until several residents diagnosed with flu); Asistencia Villa Rehab. & 
Care Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4947 (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4947.pdf (The facility violated a regulation by 
following a physician’s order to administer medications that ALJ read “black box warning” to 
restrict). 
 122. Golden Living Ctr.—Trussville v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4916 (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4916.pdf (A nurse followed facility policy by 
seeking help to deal with an intoxicated visitor). 
 123. Historically, and as recently as 2004, the Board specifically said that its review was not 
de novo. N. Mont. Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 1930 (2004). The Board has never made 
public the reason for this fundamental change in position. 
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remedies,” and so it says it has the authority to sustain sanctions on new 
theories or grounds that a petitioner never had the opportunity to 
challenge.124  
The Board also does not consider its decisions to be “precedential,” and so 
ALJs and the Board frequently render conflicting decisions on even the most 
basic procedural and substantive issues.125 And the Board specifically has held 
that it is not bound by CMS’ “Interpretive Guidelines” set forth in the “State 
Operations Manual.”126 As a result, the case reports are filled with decisions 
that announce diametrically opposite requirements based on near-identical 
facts, or results that are inconsistent with commonly accepted current 
standards of practice.127  
In some case reports, it is impossible to determine the actual evidentiary 
basis for a decision, since both ALJs and the Board routinely announce that 
the petitioner has offered “no evidence” on an issue, or that petitioner’s 
evidence and witnesses are “unpersuasive.” But some reviewing courts have 
suggested that there are due process limits to this sort of subjective decision-
making, and that CMS and the Board cannot impose sanctions without clear 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. Britthaven of Chapel Hill v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2284 (Nov. 17, 2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2009/dab2284.pdf. This position is contrary to the seminal APA case Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970), in which the Supreme Court held 
that agency action taken on one ground may not be sustained on a “post hoc rationalization” 
first articulated during an appeal of the action.  
 125. See, e.g., W. Tex. LTC Partners, Inc., d/b/a Cedar Manor, DAB Dec. No. 2652 (Sept. 
1, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2015/dab-2652.pdf; Green Oaks Health & Rehab. Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2567 (Mar. 31, 
2014), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2014/dab2567.pdf; Lopatcong Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2443 (Mar. 6, 2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2012/dab2443.pdf; Universal Healthcare—King v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2383 (June 
3, 2011), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2011/dab2383.pdf. 
 126. Foxwood Springs Living Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2294 (Dec. 31, 2009), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2009/dab2294.pdf. Petitioners frequently argue that the Interpretive Guidelines are 
not binding law because CMS did not promulgate them according to the notice and comment 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (which is an accurate recitation of the law). In 
many instances, the Interpretive Guidelines do provide a useful analytic structure for 
reviewing evidence of compliance, but some ALJs reject them even for that purpose. 
 127. See, e.g., Oak Ridge Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4865 (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4865.pdf (rejecting American Diabetes 
Association guidelines, and testimony by author of such guidelines). 
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prior notice of the standards to which a facility will be held. However, the 
Board routinely rejects such due process limits on its decision making.128 
The Board routinely holds that CMS need not offer evidence on every 
deficiency it cited in support of a sanction and that ALJs need not address 
every deficiency a petitioner contests, if CMS argues, and the ALJ can find, 
that a sanction could be, or can be, supported by fewer than all of the 
originally cited deficiencies. One court specifically has rejected this policy,129 
one has questioned it,130 and at least one has sustained it.131  
And the Board routinely holds that misstatements of evidence or 
standards of care by ALJs constitute “harmless error.”132 
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
No informed observer would argue that the overall quality of care in 
nursing facilities is worse today than it was in 1987.133 Given the advances in 
medical science, there are many residents today who would not even have 
been alive thirty years ago with similar levels of physical or mental debility. 
Nurse training is far better today than thirty years ago; clinical systems are 
more robust; there are many more physicians who have expertise and 
                                                                                                                                      
 128. See, e.g., Carrington Place of Muscatine v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2321 (June 25, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2321.pdf. 
 129. Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 130. Grace Healthcare of Benton v. DHHS, 589 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2009).  
 131. Claiborne-Hughes Health Ctr. v. Sebelius, 609 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 132. See, e.g., Longwood Healthcare Ctr., DAB Dec. No. 2394 (June 30, 2011), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2011/dab2394.pdf; Life Care Ctr. of Tullahoma v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2304 (March 
5, 2010), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2304 (The ALJ improperly held that the standard of care requires 
consultation with physician before providing diabetes care per protocol, but the deficiency 
critiquing protocol was nevertheless upheld); Plum City Care Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2272 
(Sep. 29, 2009), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2009/dab2272.pdf. 
 133. As noted in the text, the 1986 IOM Report focused on structural aspects of “quality”—
staffing, formalized assessments and care plans, resident rights, and the like. Today, CMS 
publishes “quality indicators” collected from aggregate assessment data that include items 
such as the number of residents who have fallen, the number who have new or worsened skin 
breakdowns, the number who use psychotropic medications, etc. See Quality Measures, CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (last updated Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/quality-initiatives-patient-assessment-
instruments/nursinghomequalityinits/nhqiqualitymeasures.html. Whether or not such data 
are useful in the aggregate, they rarely offer insights into the care of specific residents. 
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experience in treating geriatric patients nearing the end of life; many facilities 
employ nurse practitioners, who barely existed thirty years ago; and even the 
most remote “mom and pop” facility has access to state of the art clinical 
systems, electronic medical records, expert consultants, and the like, that 
were not widely available in pre-Internet days.  
The regulatory process arguably has not kept up with these developments, 
but more to the point of this paper, ALJ and Board Decisions continue to be 
based upon broad assertions about noncompliance similar to those CMS 
made decades ago, reinforced by “presumptions” that such arguments 
overcome a petitioner’s evidence, even about current standards of care.  
A principal reason that the enforcement process has not been able to 
address this disconnect is the unwillingness of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services and his Appeals Board to require and employ, respectively, 
the rigorous standard of review the APA requires. As suggested above, 
regulation of health and safety is a vital government function, and the 
government ought to be able to use the enforcement process to weed out poor 
facilities. CMS should win every case it brings on the merits, not by cutting 
corners or restricting review, but because surveyors, supervisors, ALJs and 
the Board focus on enforcement of clear operational and clinical standards.  
Instead, both surveyors and ALJs increasingly see themselves as armed 
with general warrants to critique specific professional judgments and facility 
“systems”—sometimes without regard to actual standards of care—and to 
work backward from unwanted resident outcomes to find some regulatory 
violation, which may or may not have caused the outcome, in order to impose 
blame. As a result, the enforcement process has increasingly drifted away 
from applying accepted clinical and quality standards to identify facilities 
that do not or cannot provide appropriate care. Instead, the process has 
drifted toward rooting out and punishing real or perceived errors, omissions 
and bad outcomes, no matter the cause, how isolated, or how implausible it 
may be that a cited error could cause any actual harm to one or more 
residents.134  
So why do facilities even bother appealing, and what is to be done?  
At least until recent years, facilities did regularly win appeals. Surveyors 
sometimes do exaggerate or misunderstand the facts, and State Survey 
Agencies, CMS and ALJs do misapply regulations.135 Occasionally, an ALJ 
                                                                                                                                      
 134. See, e.g., The Bridge at Rockwood v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4978 (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4978.pdf (making a wide-ranging critique of 
facility’s hiring, admission, care planning, staffing, and supervision “systems” not directly 
related to resident-to-resident altercation ostensibly at issue). 
 135. See, e.g., Heartland Health Care Ctr.—Kendall v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4704 (Sep. 
15, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/alj-cr4704.pdf (holding the facility not 
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holds that cited noncompliance was technical, or could not pose the risk of 
more than minimal harm, and thus could not support a sanction.136 An 
appeal may reduce a huge penalty to one of more manageable size. For 
instance, some appeals challenge only the duration of lengthy “per diem” 
CMPs. In those cases, the facility concedes noncompliance but asserts that it 
corrected the deficiencies and resumed compliance sooner than CMS says—
and some petitioners do prevail in such cases.137 ALJs or the Board sometimes 
do find that the amount of a CMP is unreasonable.138 And the actual audience 
for an administrative appeal may be the Court of Appeals, as several recent 
Court decisions limit the ability of CMS and the Board to impose sanctions 
based on ad hoc standards.139  
                                                                                                                                      
responsible for a resident falling from her wheelchair while her son was pushing her around 
the facility grounds); Kingsville Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2234 (Mar. 19, 
2009), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2009/DAB2234.pdf, remanding CR1832 (2008) (holding that ALJ improperly 
interpreted facility documents); Lake Country Nursing Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2380 
(June 6, 2011), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-
decisions/2011/cr2380.pdf (finding that the evidence did not support CMS’ argument about 
timing of resident illness); Country Hills Health Care v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2291 (Dec. 13, 
2010), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-
decisions/2010/cr2291.pdf (holding the fatal accident unforeseeable); Life Care Ctr. of 
Jefferson City v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2115 (Apr. 20, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2115.pdf 
(setting aside a citation where resident suffered sudden unexpected death); Quality Care 
Health Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2101 (Apr. 1, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2101.pdf 
(finding that the evidence showed that the nurse did consult with a physician on a timely basis 
regarding the bleeding). 
 136. See, e.g., Bella Vista Healthcare Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR2451 (Oct 12, 2011), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2011/crd2451.pdf 
(holding the notice of transfer was technically inadequate, but finding that the resident had 
actual notice and chose a new facility, so there was no risk for harm); Heritage Healthcare & 
Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Decision No. CR2116 (Apr. 20, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2010/cr2116.pdf 
(finding that the hot water exceeded the standard, but it was not hot enough to cause harm). 
 137. See, e.g., The Springs at the Watermark v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR5064 (2018) 
(sustaining the noncompliance but reducing the duration and CMP); Kindred Transitional 
Care and Rehab. – Greenfield v. CMS, ALJ Dec. No. CR4659 (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/alj-decisions/2016/cr4659.pdf, 
aff’d, DAB Dec. No. 2792 (2017) (same). 
 138. See, e.g., Life Care Ctr. of Tullahoma v. CMS, DAB Dec. No. 2304 (Mar. 5, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2304.pdf. 
 139. Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2015); Elgin Nursing & Rehab. 
Ctr. v. DHHS, 718 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2013); Grace Healthcare of Benton v. DHHS, 589 F.3d 
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Moreover, there are several collateral reasons nursing facilities continue to 
contest deficiencies and sanctions they believe are unwarranted, even if an 
appeal to the Board is unlikely to be successful. Survey findings, even if 
unwarranted, can and do support civil actions;140 Inspector General 
investigations;141 “worthless services” claims; a host of collateral state and 
federal administrative consequences, including reimbursement penalties, 
adverse certificate of need consequences (that is, requests for approval of new 
facilities or services);142 “special focus facility” designation (increased survey 
attention to facilities that have had especially bad survey histories);143 poor 
public ratings,144 and the like. Some states base licensure sanctions on specific 
survey citations.145 Most commercial insurers limit participation in provider 
                                                                                                                                      
926 (8th Cir. 2009); Emerald Shores Health Care Assocs. v. DHHS, 545 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 
2008). See also, Cal Turner Extended Care Pavilion v. DHHS, 501 Fed. Appx. 502 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 5, 2012). In one recent remarkable case, a Court of Appeals panel informed CMS during 
the hearing that it was not inclined to uphold an “abuse” finding and that CMS should settle 
the case (which it did). Oral Argument, Ridgecrest Healthcare v. Burwell, No. 14-75538 (9th 
Cir. Oct. 20, 2016), available on the Court’s website at 
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000010401.  
 140. See, T. Andrew Graham & Joseph Bianculli, “The Intersection of Regulatory and 
Personal Injury Litigation,” a paper prepared for American Health Lawyers Association Long 
Term Care and the Law Program, Feb. 2015, available at healthlawyers.org.  
 141. At any given time, the DHHS Inspector General has several active investigations of 
general nursing facility operational issues underway. See Active Work Plan Items, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-
publications/workplan/active-item-table.asp. The OIG also conducts investigations of 
individual facilities, sometimes based on adverse survey findings. 
 142. For instance, many states review the “track record” of applicants for new services or 
acquisitions, and some specifically ask applicants to report adverse survey findings at existing 
facilities. See, e.g., Oklahoma certificate of need procedures and forms at 
ok.gov/health/Protective_Health/Health_Facility_System_/Nursing_Home_Certificate_of_
Need/#UnofficialCONRule. 
 143. See https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-
Certification/MedicareProviderSupEnroll/index.html. 
 144. CMS publishes “ratings” on a one-to-five “star” system based on, among other things, 
survey citations, staffing data, and certain other criteria. See Nursing Home Compare, 
MEDICARE. GOV, medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare. Nationwide, the ratings are basically on 
a bell curve, with relatively few “one star” and “five star” facilities, but due to quirks in the 
calculation process, the ratings vary considerably from state to state and within states. There 
are many areas that have no four- or five-star facilities. Moreover, one bad deficiency can 
adversely affect the published rating for several years. 
 145. For instance, the Texas Nursing Facility Licensure Act, Section 242.061 of the Texas 
Health and Safety Code, provides for mandatory license revocation if a facility is cited for three 
“immediate jeopardy” “abuse or neglect” citations in three years—but only after final appeals 
are completed. TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 242.061(a-2)(1).  
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networks to facilities that have good survey records.146 Evidence and 
argument from even unsuccessful appeals—especially surveyor testimony 
that otherwise is unavailable in discovery in civil proceedings—may be useful 
for such collateral proceedings (and some defense counsel encourage appeals 
of enforcement sanctions that could have civil counterparts for that reason). 
The principal reason to appeal may well be psychological, that is, to support 
staff, who sometimes simply need someone to hear their side of the story.  
The reality is that some version of the current survey and enforcement 
system is likely to remain in place indefinitely, even though the enforcement 
process has arguably failed even on its own terms, as it does not—and, as 
currently structured and operated, cannot—reliably identify consistently 
poorly performing facilities, which was Congress’s goal when it enacted 
OBRA ‘87, and which seems a reasonable goal today.147 For instance, under 
the current system, surveyors could inspect two facilities next door to one 
another, both of which say they specialize in rehabilitation after hip 
replacements. One might send every resident home happy and well within a 
couple weeks; the other might send many residents back to the hospital with 
infections, generate numerous complaints, and the like. However, because 
the enforcement and appeal process as currently operated does not 
distinguish them on those bases, surveyors could cite the facility that every 
reasonable person would consider to be “good” for (perhaps even trivial) 
noncompliance, but not cite the “bad” facility for anything—and the Board 
would have no problem with that result.148 
                                                                                                                                      
 146. For instance, most commercial insurance networks require nursing facilities to 
maintain three-star, or even four-star CMS ratings (supra note 144) to participate in preferred 
provider networks. 
 147. For instance, ALJs frequently impose enhanced sanctions based on a facility’s 
supposedly poor “history” under 42 C.F.R. § 488.438(f)(1), even though nearly every facility is 
cited for some noncompliance every year. In one recent case, an ALJ sustained a termination 
action because of a series of supposedly uncorrected deficiencies, even though the evidence 
showed that a CMS official told the SSA to “go back as far as you need to find something,” and 
so the SSA simply kept re-citing the same (trivial) citations, including examples that predated 
previously-accepted corrective actions. Donelson Place Care & Rehab. Ctr. v. CMS, ALJ Dec. 
No. CR 5132 (2018). 
 148. The author has been using this hypothetical example for many years, and never once 
has a CMS official or counsel objected that it is not true. In fact, some research suggests that 
not only is there no relationship between the current survey and enforcement process and 
traditional measures of “quality,” but, perversely, there may even be an inverse relationship; 
that is, that there is no correlation between survey citations and tort findings of poor quality. 
R. Tamara Konetzka, et al., Malpractice Litigation and Nursing Home Quality of Care, 48 
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1920, (2013); David G. Stevenson et al., Does Litigation Increase or 
Decrease Health Care Quality?, 51 MED. CARE 430 (2013); David M. Studdert et al., 
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The result is that CMS now routinely tries sloppy cases based on little more 
than a surveyor’s disagreement with—or even lack of knowledge about—
specific clinical decisions nurses or even physicians have actually made; 
speculation about potential adverse outcomes or hypothetical harm; 
emotional appeals; or boilerplate assertions to the effect that facilities must 
protect residents against “neglect,” and the like. This practice is plainly 
encouraged by the Board’s result-oriented decisions.  
It is hard to believe that this practice would have developed, or would 
continue, if the Board applied traditional APA standards in appeals. 
Conversely, application of APA standards would require—and should 
require—changes to certain Board practices and policies, 
First, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should instruct his 
Board to abandon its “policy” that CMS has no real burden to demonstrate 
noncompliance but may impose sanctions based only on a “presumption” 
that every allegation and conclusion by every surveyor set forth in a 
Statement of Deficiencies—that is, the charging document—is correct. The 
Board says that this “presumption” is an artifact of its “policy” that a 
petitioner challenging a CMS action has the burden throughout the 
proceeding to demonstrate compliance. But the APA specifically provides 
that CMS, as proponent of an order imposing a sanction, has the burden to 
demonstrate the evidentiary and legal basis for its order before the petitioner 
has any obligation to offer any evidence or argument.149 That rule puts the 
burden of demonstrating noncompliance, and extracting penalties, squarely 
on the party, CMS, that is charged by law with an enforcement role.150  
Second, the Secretary should instruct his Board to abandon its “de novo” 
review policy, at least as currently employed to mean that ALJs and the Board 
have some sort of implied general warrant to oversee and intervene in the 
care of specific residents rather than reviewing the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the agency that is tasked with that process.151 As a 
                                                                                                                                      
Relationship Between Quality of Care and Negligence in Nursing Homes, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1243 (2011). 
 149. As noted above, the Board actually held in Hillman that CMS, as proponent of an 
order imposing a sanction, does have the burden to demonstrate a “prima facie case” of 
noncompliance before the burden of proceeding shifts to the petitioner to offer a defense or 
demonstrate compliance. Hillman Rehab. Ctr. v. HCFA, DAB Dec. No. 1611 (Feb. 28, 1997), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/1997/dab1611.html, aff’d, No. 98-3789 (D.N.J. 1999). However, the Board 
abandoned the Hillman rule about ten years ago.  
 150. One Court of Appeals has noted that the enforcement process is “quasi-criminal” in 
nature. Grace Healthcare of Benton v. DHHS, 589 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 151. See, e.g., Avon Nursing Home, DAB Dec. No. 2830 (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/board-dab-2830.pdf. 
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practical matter, ALJs and Board members have no special medical or health 
care operations training; indeed, their experience in the area is limited to 
what they learn in the course of specific appeals, yet they increasingly base 
decisions upon their views of how nursing facilities “ought to” operate 
(sometimes irrespective of actual CMS policy) and, as noted, sometimes even 
second-guess specific medical judgments and decisions by physicians and 
nurses.  
As a matter of administrative law, the Board has no statutory or regulatory 
authority to impose sanctions “de novo” nor to initiate or restate a charge of 
noncompliance. But the Board says that it is not bound by the Supreme 
Court’s seminal case that holds that a reviewing tribunal may not substitute 
a “post hoc rationalization” for the basis set forth by the agency for its own 
decision.152 According to the Board, that rule binds only the courts and not 
its administrative review. Thus, as discussed above, the Board has expressly 
abandoned any role as an independent reviewer of CMS’ factual assertions 
and legal interpretations, and now sees itself as the final step in the 
enforcement process, where it can fix agency errors.153 That is plainly not the 
function of the independent administrative—that is, pre-judicial—review 
that Congress contemplated in either the Social Security Act or APA—and 
that the Supreme Court has held is an element of due process in the 
administrative review context.154 Vitiation of appeal rights in this manner 
would seem to pose both APA and due process issues.  
The obvious practical question would seem to be, if the Board and its ALJs 
do not see themselves as providing independent review of agency actions, 
then who is to provide such review?  
As noted, the courts are beginning to scrutinize ad hoc surveyor findings 
as well as the result-oriented shortcuts the Board employs during the appeal 
process.155 The fact that the Board does not apply APA standards to its 
                                                                                                                                      
 152. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).  
 153. Golden Living Ctr.—Riverchase v. CMS, DAB No. 2314 (Apr. 12, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2314.pdf; Beatrice State Dev. Ctr. v. CMS, DAB No. 2311 (Mar.31, 2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2010/dab2311.pdf; Britthaven of Chapel Hill v. CMS., DAB No. 2284 (Nov. 17, 
2009), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2009/dab2284.pdf; Cal Turner Extended Care Pavilion v. CMS, DAB No. 2030 (May 
25, 2006), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/static/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/2006/dab2030.htm. 
 154. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). 
 155. This is a recent development. Before 2010 or so—that is, when the Board and its ALJs 
did exercise independent review of CMS actions—courts of appeals affirmed nearly every 
Board decision. Representative reported decisions include Windsor Place v. U.S. Dep’t of 
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reviews can be—and sometimes is—asserted as a flaw in all of the 
administrative steps that precede Board action. As a result, more cases are 
being appealed to the courts of appeals that raise the fundamental APA issues 
discussed above.  
However, while the courts have set aside some individual Board decisions, 
they have had difficulty designing and implementing effective remedies for 
systemic breakdowns of the agency’s appeals processes. For instance, DHHS’ 
parallel reimbursement disallowance appeal process has essentially ground 
to a halt under the weight of literally hundreds of thousands of pending 
appeals. A coalition of providers sought judicial intervention to break the 
logjam, and a district court ordered the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to create a process to decide all of the pending appeals, but on a 
schedule that the Secretary argued was impossible to achieve. A split court of 
appeals panel reversed the district court order, ruling that the district court 
had not adequately addressed the Secretary’s “impossibility” argument. 
However, the court did not disagree with the gist of the plaintiffs’ argument 
that providers had a reasonable expectation that the agency would hear and 
decide their appeals within a reasonable time—all agreed that the providers 
would win or settle at least some of the stalled appeals—and so the agency’s 
refusal even to address systemic delays that had the effect of tying up their 
money indefinitely was intolerable.156  
As of the publication date of this paper, that specific case remains 
unresolved, but it is notable that a panel of the Fifth Circuit sustained another 
approach to resolving the same administrative breakdown. In that case, the 
district court held that the harm caused by delays in processing 
reimbursement appeals outweighed the government’s interest in exhaustion 
of the administrative process, and so the court directed the Secretary not to 
recoup a facility’s disputed reimbursement pending the administrative 
litigation.157 The court distinguished the series of Supreme Court cases 
requiring exhaustion; according to the court, the interim remedy it devised 
balanced the petitioner’s interest in avoiding harm caused solely by the 
                                                                                                                                      
Health & Human Servs., 649 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2011); Fal-Meridian, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs., 604 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2010); Livingston Care Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 388 F.3d 168 (6th Cir. 2004); Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 
373 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2004); MeadowWood Nursing Home v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs., 364 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2004); Woodstock Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 583 
(6th Cir. 2003); and Fairfax Nursing Home v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 300 F.3d 
835 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 156. Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 157. Family Rehab., Inc. v. Azar, 886 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2018).  
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agency’s delays and the agency’s interest in preserving its enforcement 
prerogatives. 
These courts’ focus on both the direct and indirect impacts of systemic 
administrative breakdowns is not a novel issue. As long ago as 1982, for 
instance, a court of appeals panel would have allowed Medicare beneficiaries 
appealing denial of coverage for a controversial medical procedure to avoid 
exhausting the appeal process where more than 400 consecutive claimants 
had won such appeals, with the Court holding that the delays and 
unnecessary litigation themselves triggered APA and due process rights (the 
Supreme Court did reverse on the exhaustion issue).158 It is common in some 
judicial districts for judges or magistrates to award interim relief to Social 
Security claimants caught in the appeal morass. Thus, it seems likely that at 
some point, one or more judges will be offended by the Board’s delays, 
prehearing “escrows,” and, ultimately, its “facilities never win” policy, and 
they will intervene in a way that could erect significant roadblocks for the 
agency. There is no legal reason why a court offended by shortcuts in the 
Board’s appeal process could not order the Secretary to fix such flaws, or 
could even allow petitioners to avoid the process in some circumstances.159 
There really is no public policy that favors ad hoc and potentially heavy-
handed judicial intervention into legitimate enforcement prerogatives. Thus, 
the respectful suggestion is that the sooner the Secretary and the Board 
recognize that they have good reason and means to improve the Part 498 
appeal process—specifically, by rigorously applying APA standards in 
independent reviews of agency actions—the more likely they can insulate the 
results of that process against judicial second-guessing.  
Moreover, perhaps ironically, many counsel to nursing facilities believe as 
a practical matter that the Board’s outcome-oriented policies actually have 
the effect of increasing the number (and intensity) of appeals, as facility 
operators grow frustrated with seemingly arbitrary citations and penalties yet 
must exhaust the administrative appeal process before pursuing a judicial 
                                                                                                                                      
 158. Ringer v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Heckler v. 
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 627 (1984). 
 159. In 2018, a group of related nursing facilities filed a motion to the Board to require an 
ALJ to decide a series of appeals—including a termination case—that had been tried more 
than two years earlier. The Board denied the motions on the ground that even though 42 C.F.R. 
§ 498.74 requires ALJs to decide cases “[a]s soon as [is] practical,” its regulations did not allow 
a petitioner to raise the issue before the Board. Ruling in Signature Healthcare of E. Louisville 
v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Docket No. C-14-1127, Signature Healthcare of 
Pikeville v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Docket No. C-14-1916, and Donelson Place 
Care & Rehab. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Docket No. C-15-2222. The Board’s 
ruling was arguably appealable to the District Court, but the ALJ quickly issued a notice that 
notwithstanding the Board’s ruling, he would—and did—decide the cases promptly thereafter. 
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challenge where they might prevail. As noted above, in a perfect world, CMS 
would win every appeal on the merits because it had announced clear 
guidance, the surveyor had carefully documented the alleged noncompliance, 
CMS meticulously tied evidence to controlling regulatory and clinical 
standards, and ALJs found facts and applied the law as the APA 
contemplates. That would be in the agency’s best interest, but, more 
importantly, such a result would help ensure the best interests of the residents 
whom the agency is bound to serve. 
 
